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Orandum est ut sit mens sana in corpore sana.
Juvenal, Satires
Mental health law in Canada has traditionally shared many common
themes with the mental health law of such other Commonwealth
countries as Britain, Australia and New Zealand but is only a distant
cousin of the system of mental health law that has emerged in the United
States. The existence of an entrenched Bill of Rights in the United States
has fashioned a situation in which many major issues relating to the rights
of mental health patients have been dealt with as constitutional matters
of great import. Consequently, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a
burgeoning of an exciting body of case law establishing a number of
critical rights for a constituency that had tragically been largely neglected
and abused in the backwaters of American psychiatric warehouses. In
countries such as Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, on the
other hand, developments in the field of mental health law have, of
necessity, occurred largely as the result of legislative reform and the
judicial interpretation of mental health legislation rather than the
application of constitutional imperatives by the courts. As a consequence,
the structure of mental health law in these Commonwealth countries is
very different from that which has emerged in the United States.'
However, Canada is now standing at an important crossroads in the
evolution of its legal structures and traditions as a consequence of the
enactment of the Constitution Ac4 19822 and the entrenched Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Advocates in the mental health law
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1. R.M. Gordon and S.N. Verdun-Jones, "Mental Health Law and Law Reform in the
Commonwealth: The Rise of the 'New Legalism'?" in D.N. Weisstub, ed., Law and Mental
Healt"InternationalPerspectives, VoL 2 (New York, Pergamon Press, 1986) 1.
2. As enacted by the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c.1 1.
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field are anxiously waiting to see whether the advent of the Charter will
fashion major changes in the nature of Canadian mental health law. As
yet, there are no clear indicators as to what the future might bring to this
field. There have been relatively few cases, in the civil law area, that deal
with the rights of mental health patients. At least a couple of those cases
which have come to the attention of analysts suggest that the Charter
may well exert a significant impact in the years ahead, although it will be
necessary to wait for more decisions to be made at the appellate, rather
than the trial, level before any clear trend may be identified. However, in
the criminal justice sphere, one is constrained to suggest that the Charter
has, to date, shown itself to be a major disappointment as a potential
vehicle for the enhancement of the status of mentally disordered
individuals who fall into the abyss of the criminal justice system. The
impact of the Charter is a theme to which we shall return at the
conclusion of our analysis.
II. The Rise of a New Legalism?
In a recent, detailed study of the evolution of mental health law in a
number of (British) Commonwealth jurisdictions3 Gordon and Verdun-
Jones examined the thesis that a "new legalism" is emerging as a
dominant characteristic of law reform in this area. The concept of the
"new legalism" was coined by Larry Gostin,4 primarily in connection
with the passage of the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and Wales.
The "new legalism" encompasses such trends as the introduction of a
right to effective mental health services, protection against unjustifiable
deprivation of liberty, and the prevention of discrimination by
maintaining the civil and social status of patients. In particular, the term
reflects an approach that embodies a central role for law in ensuring that
the state provides effective health services for patients, effective facilities
and resources for mental health professionals and protections for patients
by placing clear limits upon such psychiatric procedures as compulsory
treatment and admission. Gostin emphasizes that the "new legalism" does
not envisage the resurrection of traditional legal formalism but rather the
evolution of a new form of legalism that is active in creating new social
policy:
It is important to remain vigilant to any attempt by the legal profession to
erect a superstructure of technical procedures or cumbersome legal
3. See Gordon and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1.
4. L. Gostin, "The Ideology of Entitlement: The Application of Contemporary Legal
Approaches to Psychiatry", in P. Bean, ed., Mentallllness: Changes and Trends (London: John
Wiley, 1983) 27, and "Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives on Mental Health Law
Reform" (1983), 10 Journal of Law and Society 47.
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regulations; nor should the discretion of lawyers and courts be substituted
for that of mental health professionals on matters of treatment. The
modem function of law ... does not usurp the role of caring professionals.
It seeks to alter social perceptions of the mental health services which
should place an emphasis on the person distressed and not on the concerns
of society or the professional s.
Gostin's "new legalism" serves as a counterfoil to what he terms
"professional discretion", a phrase designed to characterize the essential
nature of the mental health legislation that has held sway since the 1950s
in Commonwealth jurisdictions. The salient feature of the "professional
discretion" concept is the application of a policy that renders access to
treatment and the administration of mental health care matters entirely
within the discretionary decision-making powers of mental health
professionals. Underlying the concept of "professional discretion" is the
perspective that mental health professionals can only provide effective
services to their patients if they are left alone, especially by the legal
profession, which does not have the "experience or expertise in areas of
health and social services to enable them to identify needs and to propose
workable solutions" 6. Of course, it is important to emphasize that the
"new legalism"/"professional discretion" dichotomy is a useful, heuristic
device insofar as it locates the opposing poles of mental health law
reform. However, in practice, there are few (if any) jurisdictions that can
be located close to either of these poles; indeed, nearly all jurisdictions
contain elements of both "legalism" and "professional discretion". In
short, Gostin's dichotomy is useful primarily as a means of identifying the
direction of reform (L.a, towards one pole or the other) rather than a
blueprint for constructing models of mental health law systems.
In the review by Gordon and Verdun-Jones of Commonwealth
jurisdictions an attempt was made to discover whether recent mental
health law reforms lent support to Gostin's thesis that there is a
discernible trend away from the "professional discretion" approach
towards that of the "new legalism". It was ultimately concluded that the
majority of Commonwealth jurisdictions surveyed lie somewhere in the
middle of the "new legalism"/"professional discretion" spectrum. The
situation in these jurisdictions may best be described as "quasi-legalistic"
in that legal requirements are clearly imposed in relation to such issues as
civil commitment of patients and the periodic review of the status of
detained patients; however, the actual application and interpretation of
5. See Gostin, "Contemporary Social Historical Perspectives in Mental Health Law Reform",
supra note 4, at 66-67.
6. Id, at 49.
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these legislative requirements is left firmly in the hands of mental health
professionals. Furthermore, initial review of these professionals' decision-
making generally falls to administrative tribunals rather than courts and
these mental health review tribunals, in most provinces, are usually
dominated by the mental health professionals themselves. There is some
research that strongly suggests that such tribunals, in some jurisdictions at
least, have often served as "rubber stamps" in the validation of decisions
made by mental health professionals7. It was also concluded that mental
health law reforms, in a number of the jurisdictions surveyed, have
gradually moved mental health legislation towards the "new legalism"
pole of the spectrum. However, with very few exceptions, it cannot be
said that these developments have significantly altered the basic structure
of the dominant quasi-legalistic approach. In the vast majority of
jurisdictions, professional control over the commitment and treatment
processes has been left largely unchallenged, and the hegemony of mental
health professionals continues. In short, there has been very little change
in the balance of power between patients and professionals.
HI. Mental Health Law Reform in Canada
To what extent can we identify the emergence of a "new legalism" in the
mental health law reforms that have taken place in Canada in the last two
decades?
One of the central tenets of Gostin's "new legalism" is that mental
health legislation must ensure that mental health patients are guaranteed
a right to effective treatment. It would be difficult to claim that existing
mental health legislation in the majority of Canadian provinces enshrines
such a right. Only three provinces have established a statutory right to
treatment. In Alberta8, British Columbia 9 and Saskatchewan10 , the
applicable statutes place a duty upon the medical authorities to provide
a detained patient with care and treatment although it should be noted
that the right to treatment is, in each case, expressly limited by the
resources currently available to the authorities. These limitations clearly
prevent the courts from establishing a right to treatment which implies
that provincial governments may be forced by judicial decree to provide
resources to the mental health system (a form of right which has been
7. See, eg., J. Peay, "Mental Health Review Tribunals: Just or Efficacious Safeguards?"
(1981), 5 Law and Human Behavior 161.
8. MentalHealth Ac R.S.A. 1980, c. M-13, s. 13(1).
9. Mental Health Ac4 R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 256, s. 8(1)(a).
10. MentalHealth ServicesAc4 S.S. 1984-85, c. M-13.1, s. 27.
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recognized by some courts in the United States)." In particular, it is
important to recognize that no Canadian province has established a right
to receive mental health services in the community. In England and
Wales, for example, the Mental Health Ac4 198312 places a duty upon
the local authorities to provide after-care services in cooperation with the
relevant voluntary agencies. As far as Canada is concerned, it seems that
a broadly conceived right to effective mental health treatment is only
likely to be established by generous interpretation of the Charter.
Another central element in the concept of the "new legalism" is the
protection of mental health patients by the imposition of formal, legal
controls upon the decision-making procedures of mental health
professionals. Canadian mental health law has indeed witnessed a
gradual increase in such controls in the ever-evolving body of provincial
mental health legislation. In the area of civil commitment, one province
(Ontario) has made a deliberate attempt to limit the range of persons
who may be involuntarily detained in hospital and to control psychiatric
discretion in the admission of patients13. It has done this not only by
specifying the criteria for commitment in terms of dangerousness to
oneself or others but also by legislating precise, behavioural indicators for
establishing whether the "dangerousness" criteria exist in any particular
case.14 However, it is important to emphasize that the criteria for
commitment are, in most cases, applied by medical practitioners rather
than a court and commitment is legitimate if they have "reasonable cause
to believe" that the criteria have been established in any particular case.
In other words, the application of the criteria is still largely a matter of
professional opinion. 15
11. Wyattv. Stickney, 325 R Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Wyatt v.Aderholt 503 F 2d. 1305
(5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F 2d. 507 (5th Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court
of the United States has not, to date, been willing to endorse the right to receive treatment;
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). See H. Savage and C. McKague, MentalHealth
Law in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) 146.
12. S.117.
13. Mental Health Ac S.O. 1978, c.50, now R.S.O. 1980, c.262.
14. This approach has also been adopted in the legislation of the Northwest Territories: Mental
HealthAc4 S.N.W.T., 1985.
15. One recent case, however, suggests that the civil commitment criterion of "imminent and
serious physical impairment" will be interpreted strictly by the courts: Foran v. O'Doherty et
aL (Nov. 7, 1986, Ont. Dist. Ct., Fitzgerald D.C.J.), unreported, 2 A.C.W.S. (3d) 181. It was
held that mere physical impairment is not enough to satisfy this criterion; the impairment must
be both "serious" and "imminent". For further interpretation of this criterion, see also Re G.G.
and Swamy (March 12, 1986, Ont. Dist. Ct., Kurisko, D.CJ.), unreported, No. 1179/1986,
36 A.C.W.S. (2d) 247; Re LB. and O'Doherty (April 14, 1986, Ont. Dist. Ct., Kurisko,
D.CJ.); unreported, No. 1226/86, 38 A.C.W.S. (2d) 152. For application of the criterion
concerning "serious harm to others", see Re Azhar and Anderson (June 28, 1985, Ont. Dist.
Ct., Locke, D.CJ.), unreported, No. 609/85,33 A.C.W.S. (2d) 520.
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In other provinces, there has been no equivalent attempt to specify
precise, behavioural criteria for commitment. However, there is a clear
trend (in Alberta, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec and
Saskatchewan) towards requiring a threat of danger or harm to oneself or
others as a condition of commitment;16 however, these terms are left
undefined and are, therefore, wide open to the exercise of the discretion
of mental health professionals 7. The remaining Canadian provinces have
mental health statutes on the books that refer only to very broad and
nebulous criteria for commitment, generally requiring only that
involuntary detention be for the "health, welfare or safety" of the patient
or others'8. Whether the "Ontario approach" will be adopted by other
provinces within the next few years remains to be seen; however, it is
16. See: MentalHealth Ac R.S.A. 1980, c.M-13, sections 14 and 18; HospitalsAc R.S.N.S.
1967, c.249 (Consolidated 1979, c. H-19), section 26; Mental Patient Protection Ac, R.S.Q.
1977, c.P-41, section 11. These statutes refer to "dangerousness". In Saskatchewan, the
reference is to "harm" to oneself or others: Mental Health Services Ac, 1985, S.S. 1984-85,
c. M-13.1, section 24.
In New Brunswick, amendments to the Mental Health Ac, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-10, per
S.N.B. 1985, c.59, made provision for a physician to issue an examination certificate where he
or she believes that a person is mentally disordered and in need of hospitalization in the
interests of that person's safety (s.6). Long-term commitment may only occur if, inter alia, the
person's behaviour presents a substantial risk of imminent physical or psychological harm (s.7).
This Act has still not been proclaimed, however.
17. Of course, it is now almost axiomatic that "dangerousness" is difficult both to establish or
to predict in any sort of objective manner. See, eg., Pfohl, S. Predicting Dangerousness. The
Social Construction ofPsychiatric Reality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1978); Monahan, J.,
Predicting Violent Behavior. An Assessment of Clinical Techniques (Beverly Hills, California:
Sage, 1981); Hinton, J.W. (Ed.), Dangerousness Problems of Assessment and Prediction
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1983); Webster, C.D., M.H. Ben-Aron, and S.J. Hucker,
Dangerousness: Probability & Prediction, Psychiatry & Public Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985).
The Alberta Court of Queen's Bench has recently discussed the meaning of the term, "in a
condition presenting a danger to himself or others". In M. v. Alberta (1985), 63 A.R. 14,
McDonald J. was clearly dissatisfied with the manner in which psychiatrists interpreted the
term and criticized the vagueness of the phrase as it appears in s. 18 of the provincial mental
health statute. The Court was of the view that the term refers to the presence of a serious risk
of physical (l., physiological) harm to self or others and did not encompass "mental or
emotional" harm. In a case involving an application for a compulsory care order by the public
guardian under the provisions of the Dependent Aduit Ac, R.S.A. 1980, c. D-32, the Alberta
Surrogate Court interpreted the criterion that the dependent adult be "in a condition that
presents a danger to himself or others" (s. 10.1(3); emphasis added). In this particular statutory
context, the Court noted that the issue of whether the subject of the application was "in a
dangerous condition" was strictly a judicial decision and declined to issue the order sought by
the public guardian: Re Johannasen (1983), 48 A.R. 15. Both of these cases appear to indicate
that, in Alberta at least, the concept of "dangerousness" may be interpreted quite restrictively
by the courts.
18. See, eg., Mental Health Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.256, s. 1; Mental Health Act, R.S.M. 1970,
c. M-1 10, s.2; MentalHealth Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. M-9, s. 10.
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significant that the Uniform Law Commission's draft Uniform Mental
Health Act unequivocally espouses the approach.' 9
Finally, insofar as civil commitment is concerned, it should be noted
that, while Canadian courts have emphasized that the onus of establishing
that the criteria for commitment or continuing detention actually exist in
any given case rests firmly on the mental health authorities, they have
rejected the view of the U.S. Supreme Court that a special standard of
proof applies to such cases. In Addington v. Texas20, Burger C.J. held
that, in civil commitment cases, there is a special "mid-standard", lying
somewhere between the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" and the ordinary civil standard of "on the balance of
probabilities"; in short, it must be established that there is "clear and
convincing" evidence that the commitment standards have been met
before citizens may be deprived of their liberty for mental health reasons.
This approach has been unequivocally rejected in Canada, where the
appropriate standard of proof, in such cases, has been held to be the
ordinary civil standard of "on the balance of probabilities". 21 Therefore,
insofar as the standard of proof is concerned, Canadian courts have
declined to adopt the more "legalistic" approach, embodied in the
Addington v. Texas decision.
One critical area in which we might discern the gradual emergence of
the "new legalism" in certain of the Canadian mental health statutes is
that of the right to refuse treatment. The clear majority of Canadian
provinces permit the routine imposition of treatment upon all involuntary
patients whether they are competent or not.22 However, the imprint of the
19. Uniform Mental Health Act (Discussion Draft, February 19,1987).
20. (1979), 441 U.S. 418.
21. Re Robinson and Hislop (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 620 (B.C.S.C.);Re Hoskins and Hislop
(1981), 121 D.L.R. (3d) 337 (B.C.S.C.); Robinson v. Kirby (May 16, 1986, B.C.S.C.,
Taylor J), unreported, No. A840262; M. v. Alberta; supra, note 17; Re Azhar and Anderson,
supra, note 15; Re G.G. and Swamy, supra, note 15. In Re Robinson and Hislop, LockeJ.
suggested that, in applying the civil onus of proof, attention should be paid to the gravity of the
consequences for the patient.
22. See Gordon and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1, at 16-27; M. Zajc, "The Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Medication: Who Decides?" (1987), 6 Medicine and Law 45. Explicit power to
treat civilly committed patients is given in B.C., Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. In P.E.I., the power may be implied. The
situation in Quebec is somewhat uncertain. While the involuntary patient may have a right to
refuse treatment, he or she may be prevented from leaving the institution until treatment is
taken (thus rendering any right of refusal of little practical value). Judicial decisions suggest
that any right to refuse treatment in Quebec may be limited by a number of factors. In Niemiea
[1984] C.S. (Que. S.C.), forcible treatment of a non-mental health patient was authorized in
an emergency and in Institut Phillipe Pinel de Montreal v. Dion (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 234,
the Quebec trial court authorized compulsory treatment of a mentally ill man, who had been
found unfit to stand trial. See generally, M.A. Somerville, "Refusal of Medical Treatment in
'Captive' Circumstances" (1985), 63 Can. Bar. Rev. 59.
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"new legalism" may be clearly seen in the modifications of this approach
made in the mental health legislation of Nova Scotia, Ontario, and (most
recently) Saskatchewan. In Nova Scotia,23 the legislation provides that no
competent patient may be treated without his/her consent. However, it
should be pointed out that a refusal to accept treatment may be swiftly
overturned if a psychiatrist determines that the patient is incompetent (in
which case substitute consent is required). In Ontario 24, the existing
statute also provides that psychiatric treatment shall not be given to a
competent patient without his/her consent. If the patient is incompetent,
then the cdnsent of the nearest relative is required. However, if such
consent is not obtained, then the attending physician and two
psychiatrists may apply to the Board of Review for an order authorizing
treatment. The astonishing effect of these provisions is that the Ontario
Board of Review is empowered to authorize the compulsory treatment of
mental health patients, who are "competent" within the meaning of the
Act.25 Furthermore, the imposition of treatment upon a competent
patient is not even limited to "emergency" situations. Clearly, what the
Ontario legislature granted with one hand, it took away with the other.
These particular provisions of the Ontario legislation were later amended
in 198626 but the amendments had not been proclaimed into force, as of
June 1987. Under the terms of the amendments, the Board's power to
authorize the treatment of an involuntary patient is limited to those
situations in which he/she "is not mentally competent" and "where there
is no relative of the patient from whom consent may be requested to the
provision of a specific psychiatric treatment or a specific course of
psychiatric treatment of the patient".27 These amendments certainly
erased the power of the Board of Review to force treatment upon an
unwilling involuntary patient who is competent to make treatment
decisions, and they made specific provision for a patient who has been
declared incompetent to apply to the Board of Review for an inquiry into
the validity of such as determination. 2 However, the Ontario
Government appears unlikely to proclaim the amendments into force,
since it has proposed a new series of changes to the Mental Health Act 29
23. HospitalsAc4 R.S.N.S. 1967, c.249 (consd. 1979, c.H-19), sections 43,44,46.
24. Mental Health Ac R.S.O. 1980, c.262, section 35.
25. Id, section l(g).
26. S.O. 1986, c.64 (Bill 7).
27. Id, s. 33(53), repealing the old (and enacting a new) s. 35(4)(a) of the MentalHealth Act
28. Id, s. 33(52), enacting new subsections (2) (a-c) to s. 35 of the MentalHealth Act
29. Bill 190 was given first reading on January 28th, 1987. The provisions of this Bill would
reverse the thrust of the 1986 amendments insofar as they would return power to the Board
of Review to order treatment of involuntary patients, even if they are competent to make
treatment decisions. The sole exception (other than, of course, psychosurgery) would be
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It remains to be seen what will emerge from this re-opening of the issue
in the Legislature.
The recent Saskatchewan Act30 goes one step further than Nova Scotia
and Ontario by specifying that one of the criteria for civil commitment
must be that the patient is incompetent to make informed decisions
regarding treatment matters3& ' and then states that, except in the case of an
emergency, no diagnostic or treatment service or procedure may be
imposed without the consent of the patient or (if he/she is incompetent)
the consent of the nearest relative.3 2 The Act proceeds to require that any
treatment administered must be "consistent with good medical
practice" 33 (thus laying the basis for a potential legal action if such
standards are not met). The Act also specifies that the attending physician
must provide full information to the patient and must give due
consideration to the views of the latter.3
4
Another critical element in Gostin's "new legalism" is the imposition
of legal controls upon the administration of certain forms of mental
health treatments that are considered to be particularly hazardous and/or
intrusive. In Canada, the first tentative steps have been taken in this
direction by Nova Scotia, Ontario and Saskatchewan. Nova Scotia
requires the authorization of the attending psychiatrist as well as that of
two independent psychiatrists before psychosurgery may be performed
and the Board of Review is required to determine that the various
statutory requirements have been met.35 Ontario36 has prohibited the
performance of psychosurgery upon any involuntary patient, as has the
electro-convulsive therapy. These provisions have been criticized on the basis that they
represent a threat to civil liberties; see C. McKague, "Civil Rights Endangered in Mental
Health Bill", The Globe and Mail (20 April 1987) A7. Since the writing of this article, Bill 190
was amended at the Committee stage, prior to third reading. The original proposal, to return
to the Board of Review the power to override a competent patient's refusal of treatment, was
removed from the Bill. On the other hand, the most recent version of the Bill returns to the
Board the power to override the refusal of a substitute decision-maker in the case of an
incompetent patient; the substitute decision-maker would be the nearest relative or the patient's
appointed representative. See Ontario Legislative Assembly, Debates and Proceedings, at
1375-1386 (15 June 1987)
30. MentalHealth ServicesAc, S.S. 1984-85, c.M-13.1.
31. Id, section 24.
32. Id, section 25(1).
33. Id, section 25(2).
34. Id, section 25(3).
35. HospitalsAcq R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249, section 52.
36. Mental Health Ac4 R.S.O. 1980, c. 262, section 35. Note that, in an action before the
Supreme Court of Ontario, it was ruled that E.C.T. was not a form of psychosurgery.
Therefore, this procedure can be imposed compulsorily upon a competent, involuntary patient
provided that the Board of Review issues the necessary approval: Re T and Board of Review
for the Western Region et aL (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 442.
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province of Saskatchewan, 37 which extends the ban to any form of
"experimental treatment". 38 Cynics may well point out that the
imposition of controls upon psychosurgery is a cheap sacrifice to offer on
the altar of legalism since so few operations of this type are performed in
Canada. 39 Saskatchewan has gone one step beyond controlling
psychosurgery by adopting an approach manifested in the Mental Health
Ac4 1983 of England and Wales. Indeed, the Saskatchewan Act40 has
established the machinery to designate certain treatments (such as electro-
convulsive therapy) as requiring special approval procedures (presuma-
bly, these will include the requirement of at least one independent
approval).
Although it was concerned with developmental incapacity, rather than
mental illness, the case of Re Eve41 raises some important issues
concerning the inviolability of incompetent persons in the situation where
it is sought to impose non-therapeutic medical treatment. The Eve case
involved an application by a mother for permission to consent to the non-
therapeutic sterilization of her adult daughter, who was developmentally
handicapped. Although it was accepted that Eve was a "mentally
incompetent person", the trial Judge denied the application, noting that
the Court had no authority or jurisdiction to authorize a procedure the
sole purpose of which was contraceptive. However, the Supreme Court
of Prince Edward Island, in banco, allowed the mother's appeal, stating
that it had the power to authorize non-therapeutic sterilization for
mentally incompetent persons under its parens patriae jurisdiction.42 The
Supreme Court of Canada ultimately allowed the appeal of Eve's
guardian ad litem. The Supreme Court stated unequivocally that courts
should never authorize the non-therapeutic sterilization of mentally
retarded persons under the parenspatiaejurisdiction.43 In delivering the
judgement of the Court, La Forest J. said:
37. MentalHealth ServicesAc4 S.S. 1984-85, c. M-13.1, section 25(5).
38. The Northwest Territories legislation also provides that psychosurgery or "other
irreversible forms of treatment" may not be administered without the consent of a competent
patient. It also prohibits the administration of "experimental treatment involving significant
risk of physical or psychological harm": Mental Health Ac4 S.N.W.T 1985, s. 23.
39. Earp found that in all the provinces (with the exception of Quebec, for which no statistics
were available), only five such operations had been performed between January, 1975 and
April, 1977. See J.D. Earp, "Psychosurgery: The Position of the Canadian Psychiatric
Association" (1979), 24 Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 353.
40. MentalHealth Services Ac S.S. 1984-85, c. M-13.1, section 25(4).
41. (1987), 31 D.L.R. (4th) I (S.C.C.).
42. 115 D.L.R. (3d) 283,27 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 97,28 Nfld. & P.E.I.R.359.
43. For a case in which the B.C. Court of Appeal authorized the performance of a
hysterectomy on a severely retarded child on the basis that it was therapeutic (the child had a
phobic aversion to blood which, it was alleged, would seriously affect her upon the onset of
her menstrual period), see Re K and Public Trustee (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 255.
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The grave intrusion on a person's rights and the certain physical damage
that ensues from non-therapeutic sterilization without consent, when
compared to the highly questionable advantages that can result from it,
have persuaded me that it can never safely be determined that such a
procedure is for the benefit of the person. Accordingly, the procedure
should never be authorized for non-therapeutic purposes under the parens
patriae jurisdiction."
The impact of the Eve case will, probably, be quite limited insofar as it
deals only with the non-therapeutic treatment of the developmentally
handicapped. Whether the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold the
principle of personal inviolability, in this particular context, will be
extended to protect mental health patients who are being given allegedly
therapeutic treatment remains to be seen; certainly, there is nothing in the
judgement itself to indicate that the Court is, indeed, prepared to inject a
greater degree of "legalism" into the relationship between mental health
patients and mental health professionals.
To this point, we have looked only at mental health law reforms in the
civil law area. It is now time to turn our attention briefly to developments
in the sphere of criminal justice (an area which falls largely under the
jurisdiction of the federal Parliament).
There are a number of areas in which it is possible to discern the
impact of the "new legalism", although it must be stated that Canada has
been less noticeably affected by this trend than its other Commonwealth
partners 45
Unfortunately, to date, there has been very little legislative reform in
relation to the treatment of the mentally disordered in the criminal
process in Canada. Despite frequent criticism, the Lieutenant Governor's
Warrant system remains in force,46 although it is most probable that
major reforms will be made to the Criminal Code in the near future47. In
any event, under the existing system, those individuals acquitted of
offences by reason of insanity or found unfit to stand trial continue to be
44. (1987), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 1, at 32.
45. See Gordon and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1, at 75-76.
46. For an example of such criticism, see the Law Reform Commission of Canada, A Report
to Parliament on Mental Disorder in the Criminal Process (Ottawa: Information Canada,
1976).
47. On June 25, 1986 the (then) Minister of Justice, Mr. Crosbie, introduced draft legislation
to "modernize and clarify" the Criminal Code provisions relating to mentally disordered
offenders. Parliament has since been prorogued. It is expected that the amendments will,
eventually, be reintroduced in one form or another. See Minister of Justice, Information Paper.
Mental Disorder Amendments to the Criminal Code (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney
General of Canada, June 1986) and Proposed Amendments to the Criminal Code (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, 23-6-86). The substance of the proposed amendments is discussed, infra, in
the section concerning the impact of the Charter.
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held at the pleasure of the executive arm of government. 48 This situation
compares unfavorably with a number of other Commonwealth
jurisdictions (such as New South Wales, the Northern Territory of
Australia and New Zealand), where the courts have been assigned a
significant role in the supervision of the accused's indeterminate
detention, or with England and Wales, where the Mental Health Act,
1983 has granted the Mental Health Review Tribunal the right to release
accused persons held at "Her Majesty's pleasure".49 In Canada, the only
significant reform, in recent years, has been the creation of Advisory
Boards of Review in each province.50 These boards review the cases of all
individuals held under Lieutenant Governor's warrants on a regular basis.
However, the recommendations of the boards do not bind the Lieutenant
Governor in the exercise of his/her discretion and the individual accused
person has absolutely no power to initiate a review of the detention on
his/her own account.
The only major improvement in the legal status of those held under a
Lieutenant Governor's Warrant has come from the courts, which have
placed the Boards of Review under a duty to act fairly. This development
is part of a larger trend, in which the courts have imposed a duty to act
fairly upon all administrative decision-making bodies whose decisions or
recommendations are likely to have significant impact upon an
individual's legal rights.51 The duty to act fairly has been imposed upon
the advisory boards of review despite the fact that their decisions are only
recommendations made to the Lieutenant Governor. It has been held that
it is part of the duty to act fairly that the boards make patients' files
available to their counsel in advance of a hearing.52 Similarly, it has been
ruled that a board acted unfairly when the two psychiatrists on the board
examined the patient and then discussed the case with their colleagues in
the absence of the patient or his counsel.53 In Re McCann and The
Queen,54 the British Columbia Court of Appeal went so far as to set aside
an order of the Lieutenant Governor because the Board of Review had
not acted fairly in making its recommendation to him. Significantly, the
duty of fairness has now been clearly extended to the Lieutenant
48 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, sections 542,543, and 545.
49. See Gordon and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1, at 75-76.
50. Criminal Code, section 547.
51. See Gordon and Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1, at 34-36.
52. InReAbeletaL andAdvisory ReviewBoard (1980), 56 C.C.C.(2d) 153 (Ont.C.A.).
53. In Re Egglestone and Mousseau and Advisory Review Board (1983), 6 C.C.C. (3d).1
(Ont.D.C.).
54. (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 180 (B.C.C.A.).
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Governor him/herself as a consequence of the important case of Re
Jollimore and The Queen55. In this case, the Lieutenant Governor of
Nova Scotia had ordered the transfer of an insanity acquittee to a
penitentiary in New Brunswick before the Board of Review had,
completed its consideration of his case. Burchell J., of the Trial Division
of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, set aside this transfer on the basis that
the canons of procedural fairness had not been followed. While the
Lieutenant Governor is clearly not obliged to act on the advice of the
Board, he/she may not arbitrarily cut off or pre-empt the legislatively
prescribed role of the Board by acting before receiving its formal
recommendations.
Another judicial development that has potentially enhanced the legal
status of individuals held under a Lieutenant Governor's warrant is the
Dion case,56 in which the trial court rejected the contention of psychiatric
authorities that they had the power to impose treatment without consent
upon all those individuals held under such a warrant. The court ruled that
each case must be looked at individually by the courts. In this particular
case, the accused, who had been found unfit to stand trial but had not
been involuntarily committed, was refusing all medication because he
distrusted his doctors. If the accused continued to refuse treatment, the
prospect was that he would not become fit to stand trial and would be
likely to suffer detention "in perpetuity". In these particular
circumstances, the Court believed it was appropriate to use its parens
patriae jurisdiction to override the accused's refusal to take treatment.
57
The case does not appear to have turned on the question of the accused's
incompetence to make treatment decisions on his own behalf, although
the Court evidently thought that he was, in fact, incompetent.5 8 The Dion
case is of potentially great significance since the Court clearly rejected the
notion that all accused persons held under a Lieutenant Governor's
warrant may be forcibly treated merely because of their status.
59
Canadian judicial decisions in the area of criminal responsibility bear
the imprint of the "new legalism" insofar as they reflect a policy of
restricting the role of psychiatrists in this area. The Supreme Court of
55. (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 166 (N.S.S.C.).
56. InstitutPhillipePineldeMontrealv. Dion (1983), 2 D.L.R. (4th) 234 (Durand, J.)
57. Zajc, supra, note 22, at 54, indicates that the resort to a parens patriae jurisdiction was
novel in the context of Quebec. See also Somerville, supra, note 22.
58. Supra, note 56 at 239-241.
59. Id, at 242. It is interesting that the Court ruled that, in this particular case, the Institut was
required to establish a "special medical committee to review the respondents case regularly".
An appeal was made to the Quebec Court of Appeal, but was dismissed in May 1984; see Zajc,
supra, note 22, at 65.
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Canada has recently adopted an increasingly restrictive interpretation of
section 16 of the Criminal Code, which sets out the criteria for the
insanity defence.60 By so doing, the Court has unequivocally restricted the
range of psychiatric evidence that may be considered relevant to the issue
of insanity. Indeed, in one leading case,61 the Supreme Court went so far
as to impose severe restrictions upon the type of opinion evidence that
psychiatrists may give in insanity defence cases, leading to the suggestion
that the defendant may be required to enter into the witness box to
establish the nature of his/her alleged delusions. In addition, the Supreme
Court has severely restricted the scope of the defence of non-insane
automatism, a defence which leads to a total acquittal (as compared with
the partial acquittal that occurs after a successful insanity defence). In
order to achieve success in the assertion of a defence of non-insane
automatism, the accused must satisfy the Court that his/her mental
condition was not the consequence of some pathological condition or, in
the terms of the Criminal Code, a "disease of the mind". If the Court rules
that the accused's condition was, indeed, caused by a "disease of the
mind", then he/she will be considered to have raised the defence of
insanity rather than non-insane automatism and any acquittal will result
in detention under a Lieutenant Governor's warrant. The Court has
effectively reduced the range of psychiatric evidence that may be
introduced in relation to the defence of non-insane automatism by
emphasizing that the term "disease of the mind" is a legal rather than a
medical concept and that the courts are not willing to defer to psychiatric
determinations on this matter.62 In this sense, the approach of the
Supreme Court may be termed "legalistic".
IV. The Charter and Mental Health Law
It is perhaps too early to evaluate the impact of the Charter of Rights
upon the emerging field of Canadian mental health law. However, one
important influence will be on the legislative process insofar as provincial
legislatures attempt to revise their mental health statutes so that they are
not perceived to be in contravention of the Charter. A clear example of
60. In particular, it has adopted a narrow interpretation of the phrase "nature and quality of
an act"; Regina v. Abbey (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 394 and Kjeldsen v. the Queen (1981), 64
C.C.C. (2d) 161. In addition, it has strongly rejected the relevance of irresistible impulse to the
insanity defence under section 16; Chartrand v. The Queen, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 314. For
consideration of these cases, see Regina v. Kirby (1985), 21 C.C.C.(3d) 31 (Ont. C.A.) and
Regina v. Swain (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 385 (Ont. C.A.).
61. Regina v. Abbey (1982), 68 C.C.C. (2d) 394. See also, Regina v. Kirby, supra, note 60.
62. Rabey v. The Queen (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 1.
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such a development is provided by the recently enacted Saskatchewan
Mental Health Services Act 198563
It is, however, somewhat surprising both that relatively little scholarly
analysis has occurred in this specific area64 and that so few judicial cases
appear to have raised Charter issues. There have certainly been no
landmark cases cast in the mould of the great mental health law cases in
the American courts. As yet, there have been no Canadian cases
establishing constitutional rights to treatment, to refuse treatment or to
receive treatment in the least restrictive environment. Perhaps the relative
paucity of such cases reflects the absence of a tradition of an adequately
funded and aggressive system of delivering advocacy services on behalf of
mental health patients in Canada as a whole.65 However, it may also
reflect the view that the Charter might not be interpreted in an expansive
manner by a judiciary that has historically been reluctant to second guess
the "good faith" decisions made by mental health professionals in the
course of their work. As McQuaid J. said, on behalf of the P.E.I.
Supreme Court in a recent case 66:
63. S.S. 1984-85, C. M-13.1. See also Minister's Advisory Committee, Report on the Mental
Health Act (St. John's: Ministry of Health and Social Services, Newfoundland, 1982); Social
Services and Community Health, Alberta, Report of the Task Force to Review the Mental
Health Act (Edmonton: Ministry of Social Services and Community Health, Alberta, 1983);
S.N. Verdun-Jones & R.M. Gordon, Mental Health andAdult Guardianship Law in the Yukon
(Whitehorse: Department of Health and Human Resources, Yukon, 1985).
64. See RM. Gordon & S.N. Verdun-Jones, "The Implications of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms for the Law Relating to Guardianship and Trusteeship" (1987), 10
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 21; E. Newman, "Charter Implications for
Procedures under the Ontario Mental Health Act" (1985), 5 Health Law in Canada 60; E.
Keyserlingk, "Consent to Treatment: the Principles, the Provincial Statutes and the Charter of
Rights and Freedom?' (1985), 33 Canada's Mental Health 7; E. Reichenfeld, "Elderly
Psychiatric Patients in Institutions - Implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1985), 5 Health Law in Canada 83; Savage and McKague, supra, note 11, at 248-
256.
65. See generally, A. Kaiser, "Legal Services for the Mentally III: A Polemic and a Plea"
(1986), 35 U.N.B. Law J. 89; R.M. Gordon, "Legal Services for Mental Health Patients: Some
Commonwealth Developments" (1981), 4 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 171;
and "Legal Services for Mental Health Patients: Some Practical and Theoretical Observations
on Canadian and Australian Developments" (1982), 1 Australian Journal of Law and Society
101. In recent years, Toronto has witnessed the advent of a greater degree of organization on
the part of advocates working on behalf of a variety of disabled constituencies, including the
mentally ill (eg. the Advocacy Resource Centre for the Handicapped (ARCH) and Committee
on Legal Issues in Psychiatry (CLIP)). In many other areas of Canada, there have certainly
been individual advocates who have been aggressively and ably asserting the rights of mental
health patients but they have been acting without the benefits of an adequately funded
organizational structure. See Savage & McKague, supra, note 11, at 239-240.
66. Reference Re Procedures and the Mental Health Act (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 577
(P.E.I.S.C. in banco).
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... the law, as I perceive it to be, leans in favour of the care and treatment
of those who do suffer, even by involuntary detention if need be, when
that illness has been diagnosed by those practitioners skilled in the
discipline, and only for the gravest reasons should the court, or a board, an
inquiry or review, substitute its lay opinion for the professional opinion.67
To date, insofar as the civil side of mental health law is concerned,
there still have been no major Charter cases that have been decided by
the Supreme Court of Canada. Although Charter issues were raised
before the Supreme Court of Canada in the Eve case, 68, they,
unfortunately, received rather short shrift. To the contention that section
7 of the Charter protects a fundamental right to "free procreative choice",
the Court ruled that this section was not applicable since it only operated
to protect individuals from "laws or other state action that deprive them
of liberty"; there were no such laws or state action in question in this
particular case. The Court left open the question of whether the right to
procreate would be protected by section 7 and its guarantees in relation
to "life, liberty and the security of the person".69
Most of the Charter cases involving challenges to the process of civil
commitment have not advanced beyond the trial level, although the two
cases that have reached the appellate court level have raised issues of
considerable significance. In general, it is clear that Canadian courts are
most unwilling to strike down any of the provisions of provincial mental
health legislation, although it does appear, from at least one case, that
they are prepared to provide a remedy to a particular individual whose
constitutional rights have been infringed by the mental health authorities.
67. Id, at 591. Illustrative of the somewhat lenient attitude of the courts towards mental health
professionals is Ketchup v. Hislop andR. in Right of British Columbia (1984), 54 B.C.L.R. 327
(S.C.). In this case, it was found that the plaintiff had been committed to hospital unlawfully
insofar as there were major irregularities in the certificates of commitment. The Court noted
that "to be involuntarily committed to a mental health facility involves, of course, a very severe
curtailment of the liberty of the person" (at 331). However, since the defendants had acted "in
good faith" and the plaintiff had needed the care and treatment (from which she benefitted),
she was awarded only $500 in damages. The plaintiff had been forcibly treated and detained
for five weeks before gaining her release.
68. Supra note41.
69. Id, at 35. The Court also dismissed the rather strange argument, made by the respondents,
to the effect that section 15 guaranteed the right of the mentally disabled to have a non-
therapeutic sterilization. The Court pointed out that the issue of sterilization bad not been
raised by the person affected but rather by a third party (in this case, the mother).
Section 7 was also raised in a case involving a proceeding to determine whether an
individual was mentally incompetent within the meaning of the Ontario Mental Incompetency
Act. In Clark v. Clark, Matheson Co.Ct. J. held that the effect of section 7 was "procedural"
rather than "substantive" in nature and that, therefore, it did not apply to the application.
However, this narrow interpretation of the effect of section 7 has been rejected by the Supreme
Court of Canada. Reference Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Ac4 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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The most dramatic Charter case has been that of Lussa v. The Health
Science Centre and Director of Psychiatric Services7 . The case is highly
significant in that it resulted in the release of an involuntarily committed
patient on the basis of the infringement of her rights under three different
sections of the Charter. An application for habeas corpus was made on
behalf of Theresa Lussa after she had been civilly committed under the
provisions of the Manitoba Mental Health Act The Manitoba Court of
Queen's Bench noted that the patient had been detained for 14 days and
ruled that her continued detention would constitute an infringement of
Section 7 of the Charter. The Court reached this conclusion on the basis
that there was no evidence establishing that the patient was dangerous to
herself or others or that she fell within any of the emergency situations
provided for by the Mental Health Act Therefore, in the view of the
Court, her continued detention would not be in accordance with the
"fundamental principles of justice" enshrined in section 7 of the Charter.
The Court employed similar reasoning in ruling that continued detention
would constitute "arbitrary" detention, contrary to section 9 of the
Charter. Finally, it was held that the patient's rights under section 10 of
the Charter had been infringed. This section requires that everyone who
has been detained has the right to be informed promptly of the reasons
therefor and to be informed of the right to retain and instruct counsel.
The Court held that, for the purposes of section 10, it was not adequate
for the hospital to post a sign in the ward. The authorities were under an
obligation to ensure that the patient understood her rights or,
alternatively, that she was not capable of understanding them because of
her condition. Apparently, no such efforts were made in this case and,
therefore, the provisions of section 10 had been infringed. Of course, this
decision was made only at the trial level and it remains to be seen
whether the Court's use of the Charter as a sharp instrument for
challenging involuntary detention in a mental health facility will set the
trend for future judicial incursion into this area of mental health law.
A second case in which the potential contribution of the Charter to the
field of mental health patients' rights was highlighted is that of In
Reference Re Procedures and the Mental Health ACt,71 where the P.E.I.
Supreme Court ruled that, as a consequence of section 10(c) of the
Charter, a mental health patient maintains the right to challenge the
validity of his/her involuntary detention by the remedy of habeas corpus
despite the fact that it appeared that the provincial mental health statute
72
70. (1983), 9 C.R.R. 350 (Man. Q.B.).
71. (1984), 5 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (P.E.I.S.C. in banco).
72. Mental Health Acg R.S.P.E.L 1974, c. M-9.
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precluded reliance upon this traditional common law remedy. This case
is, therefore, of considerable significance since it apparently enshrines the
right of mental health patients to the prerogative remedy of habeas
corpus despite the attempt of a provincial legislature to substitute another
(perhaps less efficacious) remedy of its own in its mental health
legislation2 3 At the same time, however, the Court ruled that the
provincial mental health legislation did not infringe the guarantees of
equal treatment for the mentally disabled embodied in section 15 of the
Charter. McQuaid J. pointed out that, from "the earliest days of English
legal history", the mentally ill had been "treated as a separate class,
requiring and deserving of special care and consideration by the Crown
itself but, by reason of their infirmity, subject to certain restrictions as to
their freedom of conduct." It could not be argued, in light of this
historical precedent, that these restrictions were not "reasonable limits"
insofar as section 1 of the Charter is concerned. 74 This approach to the
constitutionality of the civil commitment provisions of provincial mental
health legislation has been strongly echoed in the other recent cases in
which Charter issues have been raised.
In Thwaites v. Health Sciences Centre Psychiatric Facility and Health
Sciences Centre75, an involuntarily committed patient applied for a
declaration that section 15 of the Manitoba Mental Health Act76, which
made provision for civil commitment, was unconstitutional. Reference
was made to sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Charter. Ultimately, Scollin J.
ruled that the Manitoba legislation did not infringe any of the guarantees
contained in the Charter and that, even if the civil commitment
provisions did infringe any of these guarantees, they represented
"reasonable limits" which could be justified in a free and democratic
society within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. The Court
rejected the suggestion that the compulsory commitment process was
arbitrary even though considerable reliance must be placed on the
exercise of medical judgement:
The field of mental health is manifestly far from cultivated. As the various
studies indicate, there is ample scope for genuine divergence of
professional opinion and consequent differences and uncertainties in social
and legislative policy. Incomplete knowledge and imperfect solutions may
deny this legislation a place in the civil liberties hall of fame, but is it saved
73. McQuaid J. did make clear that he thought that the procedures contained in the Mental
Health Act were perfectly adequate and that, given the existence of an alternate remedy, it was
highly unlikely that a patient would be able to avail him/herself of the remedy of habeas
corpus (at 584).
74. Id, at 589-590.
75. [1987] 1 W.W.R. 468 (Man. Q.B.).
76. S.M., c. M-1 10.
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from the brand of the arbitrary by the existence of a broad but
ascertainable test and its ultimate dependence, in common with other
legislation, on professional ability and integrity. In this case, both medical
and judicial decisions are involved.... Given the standard as formulated,
the committal process in the present type of case is not unreasonable,
despotic, capricious or the like and does not fall within any of the other
shades of meaning of the word "arbitrary". 77
The case of Willis v. O'Reilly et a. 78 raised an interesting procedural
issue; namely, whether a patient may obtain an interlocutory injunction
restraining the hospital authorities from continuing detention and
administering treatment pending a determination of the constitutionality
of the civil commitment legislation in question. Maurice J., of the
Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench, recognized that, if the plaintiff
were ultimately successful at trial, then "damages will not adequately
compensate her for the harm she would have suffered through
involuntary detention and treatment". 79 However, the Judge declined to
grant an injunction on the basis, inter alia, that, if the plaintiff were
successful in her application, all involuntary patients pursuant to the
Mental Health Services Act would equally be entitled to their release
pending the hearing of their cases:
Irreparable harm to the public would ensue from the release of patients
who could cause harm to themselves or to others. There can be no
injunction in the face of this danger.80
The Judge also noted that the "balance of convenience" required that a
law be considered constitutional until found otherwise.
The case of Kohn v. Globerman and Shane; Kohn v. Winnipeg et al.81
raises some potentially disturbing issues in the context of the potential
contributions of the Charter to the evolution of patients' rights in the
process of civil commitment. The plaintiff had been involuntarily
committed to a psychiatric hospital but had been released two days later
on the grounds that he was not a danger to himself or others. He
commenced two separate, legal actions. The first action was against the
77. [1987] 1 W.W.R. 468, at 477. In Clark v. Clark; supra, note 69, the Court rejected the
contention that the Ontario Mental Incompetency Act permitted arbitrary imprisonment,
contrary to section 9 of the Charter. It was noted that the Act "is designed to protect those
persons who by reason of arrested or incomplete development of mind need protection" (at
344). A challenge to the constitutionality of the Ontario Mental Health Act, on the basis of
sections 7, 9 and 12 of the Charter, was similarly rejected without extended reasoning in Re
AzharandAnderson, supra, note 15.
78. (1986), 12 C.P.C. (2d) 257 (Sask. Q.B.).
79. Id, at 259.
80. Id
81. [1986] 4 W.W.R. 1 (Man.C.A.).
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two psychiatrists, who had initially examined him and made committal
orders. It alleged a conspiracy to falsely imprison him and sought a
declaration that various sections of the Manitoba Mental Health Act
infringed the Charter. The second action was against the two psychiatrists
and others, alleging negligence, defamation, assault, false imprisonment
and conspiracy. Section 96 of the Manitoba Act provided that a Judge of
the Court of Queen's Bench may, upon summary application, stay
proceedings brought against persons who were acting in pursuance of the
legislation if he/she is satisfied that "there is no reasonable ground for
alleging want of good faith or of reasonable care". In this case, the
psychiatrists made a successful application to have the actions stayed.
There was an appeal to the Manitoba Court of Appeal and, by a majority
of 2-1, the decision of the Court of Queen's Bench was upheld. Of course,
the immediate result of this decision was that the plaintiff was effectively
precluded from having the merits of his constitutional challenges
adjudicated. Speaking for the majority, Twaddle J.A. took a remarkably
narrow approach to this particular matter and stated that the
constitutional issues that had been raised did not involve the two
defendant psychiatrists and that they were entitled to the protection of
section 96 of the Mental Health Act.82 The Justice went on to say that:
The Charter thus ensures that no right guaranteed by it can be removed or
restricted by legislative enactment, but it does not confer rights as between
private citizens. Such rights must be determined by the ordinary law
subject, of course, to the proviso that the statutory component of the
ordinary law may be invalid to the extent that it purports to restrict the
constitutional rights.83
The Justice's judgement later concluded with the observation that the
Charter does not prohibit the protection from liability of those who
exercise statutory powers and asserted that such protection is not
dependent on the validity of the power granting it:
It would be unjust to impose on these defendants a liability for carrying
out the responsibilities imposed on them by the legislature because the
legislature had exceeded its constitutional authority.84
This line of reasoning is cause for considerable concern insofar as the
future role of the Charter in the mental health law area is concerned. As
O'Sullivan J.A. noted in dissent:
I agree that the Charter does not confer rights as between private citizens
acting as such. But in the case before us it is alleged that the psychiatrists
82. Id, at 16.
83. Id
84. Id, at 18.
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misused state-given powers and I think that the Charter does apply to
citizens who purport to exercise state-given powers where such exercise is
in violation of constitutional rights.85
The ruling of the majority clearly raises doubts as to the efficacy of
Charter rights if they are not exercisable against mental health
professionals acting under a statutory scheme of civil commitment. This
particular case is also troublesome insofar as the plaintiff acted on his
own behalf, without the benefit of counsel, and failed to challenge the
constitutionality of section 96 of the Mental Health Act, a course which
would have required the Court to determine this particular issue. One
wonders if the majority would have adopted the same, highly restrictive
approach had counsel appeared for the plaintiff.
V. Dangerous Offender Legislation
In the area of the notorious dangerous offender provisions of the
Criminal Code, the Charter has merely fizzled, like a wet firecracker,
instead of bursting like a bombshell. Indeed, there have been at least eight
reported court decisions in which Part XXI of the Criminal Code has
been attacked on the basis of the Charter, and in not one of these cases
has such an attack even come close to being successful. Section 7 of the
Charter is intended to guarantee the "life, liberty and security of the
person" and to ensure that he/she will not be deprived of these "except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice". A number of
cases86 have now held that the dangerous offender provisions of the Code
do not violate this provision of the Charter. In one interesting case,87 it
was contended that evidence relating to the alleged future dangerousness
of the accused should not be admissible because psychiatric or
psychological evidence as to dangerousness is highly speculative at best
and, is such, has very limited probative value. On this basis, it was
contended that the dangerous offender provisions88 offended the
85. Id, at 8.
86. R. v. Gustavson (1982), 1 C.C.C. (3d) 470 (B.C.S.C.); P. v. Langevin (1984), 11 C.C.C.
(3d) 336 (Ont.C.A.); P. v. Lewis (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont.C.A.); R. v. Lyons (1984),
15 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (N.S.C.A.); Re Moore and the Queen (1984), 10 C.C.C. (3d) 306 (Ont.
H.C.J); R. v. Vandale (Ont. 31, 1984) 13 W.C.B. 173 (B.C.C.A.). Note that, in Lewis, leave
to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was subsequently granted; however, the appeal was
later abandoned owing to the death of the appellant ((1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 288 (S.C.C.)).
The Lyons case subsequently reached the Supreme Court of Canada, which ruled (by a 5-2
majority) that the dangerous offender provisions of the Code do not contravene sections 7, 9,
1 l(f) or 12 of the Charter. See Lyons v. The Queen (1987), 37 C.C.C. (3d) 1.
87. Re Moore and the Queen, id
88. In particular, s. 688(a) of the Code
854 The Dalhousie Law Journal
fundamental principles of justice, protected by s. 7 of the Charter,
because they permit the admission of evidence that has little or no
probative value. The Ontario High Court rejected this line of reasoning.
While admitting that evidence as to future dangerousness may indeed be
highly speculative, the Court held that the dangerous offender provisions
were not in breach of s. 7 of the Charter because the National Parole
Board would review the offender's case after three years and, at that
stage, could consider any fresh evidence relating to his/her future
dangerousness. The original three-year term of incarceration can be
justified, said the Court, on the basis of the need to punish the accused for
the offence(s) of which he/she has been convicted as well as the need to
protect society from his/her "potential for dangerousness".89
Another attack on the constitutionality of the dangerous offender
provisions of the Code was launched under the banner of s. 9 of the
Charter, which was designed to protect the citizen from arbitrary
detention or imprisonment. In a case decided in the Supreme Court of the
Northwest Territories, 90 it was held that the indeterminate sentence
provided for by the dangerous offender provisions of the Code did not
constitute arbitrary imprisonment because s. 688 made provision for a
"rational and principled determination to be made by the courts". 91 In
this case, the Court did not address the issue of whether psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness could indeed provide the foundation
for such a "rational and principled determination" by the trial Judge.
Section 12 of the Charter, which prohibits the imposition of "cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment", has also been summoned in aid by
those who would challenge the constitutionality of the dangerous
offender provisions.92 The courts have lit a faint glimmer of hope in
relation to section 12. In Langevin,93 the Ontario Court of Appeal
rejected the section 12 challenge, apparently on the grounds that the
indeterminate sentence was not "cruel and unusual punishment", given
Parliament's overall objective of protecting society, and that it was not
likely that the offender would remain in custody "beyond the period of
time during which he is considered dangerous" because the National
89. Re Moore and the Queen, supra, note 86 at 310-311. In Langevin, supra, note 86, the
Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that studies indicating the unreliability of psychiatric
predictions as to future dangerousness only affected the weight to be accorded to such
psychiatric evidence and not its admissibility.
90. Regina v. Simon (no.3) (1982), 69 C.C.C. (2d) 557.
91. Id, at 560.
92. See generally, W.S. Tarnopolsky, "Just Deserts or Cruel and Unusual Treatment or
Punishment? Where Do We Look for Guidance", 10 Ottawa Law Review 1.
93. Supra, note 86.
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Parole Board was charged with making periodical reviews of his/her
detention.94 No mention was made of the fact that the Parole Board also
is forced to rely on unreliable psychiatric predictions of future
dangerousness. However, other decisions have indicated that, while the
dangerous offender provisions themselves do not contravene section 12
of the Charter, there may nevertheless be individual cases in which the
particular offender is entitled to relief under the Charter. Indeed, In
Moore,95 the Ontario High Court clearly appeared to leave the door open
to such a possibility.96 In Re Mitchell and the Queen97, a case involving
a man who had been labelled an "habitual criminal" under provisions
that were repealed in 1977, Justice Linden took an approach that could
set the stage for the future use of section 12 of the Charter as a means of
terminating excessively long periods of detention in individual cases.
Mitchell had been detained as an "habitual criminal" for 12 years despite
the fact that he had only been convicted of mainly "petty" property
offences. Justice Linden ruled that Mitchell's detention might be in
violation of section 12 of the Charter
... I find that the continued detention of the applicant, if in fact he is no
more than a social nuisance and not a danger to the public, satisfies the
disproportionality test. To continue to detain such a man for more than 12
years surpasses all rational bounds of treatment or punishment and is so
excessive as to outrage standards of decency.98
However, it is interesting to note that Mitchell was not released at this
point because the Court ruled that there was no evidence before it as to
whether he was, in fact, dangerous. Justice Linden, therefore, ruled that
a second hearing could be held, in which Mitchell would be invited to
prove that he was not a danger to society.99 Needless to say, it remains to
be seen whether the approach embraced by Justice Linden will ever be
applied so as to release an individual from continued indeterminate
detention as a dangerous offender.
While there may be a faint glimmer of hope in the area of dangerous
offender legislation, there is absolutely nothing to raise even this degree
of hope in the courts' application of the Charter to the instrumentality of
the Lieutenant-Governor's Warrant (LGW) that is responsible for the
94. Id, at 359-363. See also R v. Lyons, supra, note 86 and R. v. Noyes (1986), 6 B.C.L.R.
306 (S.C.).
95. Supra, note 86.
96. Id, at 311-314.
97. (1983), 6 C.C.C.(3d) 193 (Ont. H.Ct.).
98. Id, at 219.
99. Id, at 221. There is no subsequent report to indicate the outcome of such a hearing (if one
was held).
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indeterminate incarceration of those acquitted by reason of insanity or
found unfit to stand trial. In a particularly instructive case, R. v.
Kieling,100 the accused had been confined for nine months under an
LGW despite the fact that the maximum sentence for the offence, with
which Kieling was charged, was only six months' imprisonment.
However, the Ontario County Court ruled that this situation did not
contravene section 12 of the Charter, which guards against "cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment". It was held that the Review Board
procedure prevented the possibility of unreasonable and unjustified
detention and that the applicable provisions of the Criminal Code01 were
intended both to ensure the treatment of the accused and the protection
of the public and to place the accused in a position to make a full answer
and defence as expeditiously as possible.
In Re Rebic and the Queen,02 the B.C. Supreme Court rejected an
assault on the constitutionality of the LGW in a situation where the
accused had been acquitted by reason of insanity in relation to a charge
of threatening to use a weapon while committing an assault. It was
contended, by the accused's counsel, that section 542(2) of the Code
contravenes the equality of rights guaranteed by section 15 of the
Charter. Murray J. swiftly rejected this contention by quoting from the
judgement of the Ontario Court of Appeal in a case decided under the
Canadian Bill of Rights, in 1980:103
Society has a legitimate social interest in persons who have committed
some serious social harm, but who have been found not to be criminally
responsible on account of mental disorder; it is justified in subjecting those
persons to further diagnosis and assessment, in exercising appropriate
control over them, if necessary, and in providing them with suitable
medical treatmentY14
However, Murray J. took the argument one step further by also holding
that the applicable Code provisions should be considered as an
affirmative action programme for the mentally disabled! Section 15(2) of
the Charter permits unequal treatment of, inter alia, the mentally
disabled, where such treatment occurs in the context of "any law,
program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions"
of those who are disadvantaged by way of mental disability. The B.C.
Court of Appeal subsequently upheld this decision, albeit adopting a
somewhat different line of reasoning. 05 In dealing with the contention
100. (April 21, 1983), 9 W.C.B. 471 (Ont. Co. Ct).
101. Sections 543 and 545 of the Criminal Code
102. (1985), 20 C.C.C.(3d) 196.
103. R. v. Saxell (1980), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 176.
104. Id, at 187.
105. (1986), 28 C.C.C. (3d) 154.
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that section 542(2) of the Code infringed section 15 of the Charter, the
Court ruled that the true parallel to be drawn, in terms of equitable
treatment, was between the insanity acquittee and a person convicted of
an offence rather than between an insanity acquittee and a person
acquitted of an offence in the normal fashion. In the Court's view, a
person acquitted by reason of insanity must first be proved to have
committed the conduct which constitutes the gist of the criminal charge
and, once this has been done, he/she is only "acquitted" because of his/
her mental condition at the time of the act in question. Therefore, it was
held that there was no inequality of treatment between insanity acquittees
and other acquitted persons.
A similar approach was adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Regina v. Swain.106 In this case, the majority of the Court ruled that
section 542(2) of the Code must be viewed in light of the overall statutory
scheme for dealing with those accused persons who have been acquitted
by reason of insanity. In the majority's view, this overall scheme did not
infringe upon the principles of fundamental justice, guaranteed by section
7 of the Charter. Thorson J.A. noted that the requirements of due process
are met by the provisions found in sections 545 and 547 of the Code.07
It was also held that section 542(2) did not violate the accused's
protection against arbitrary detention or imprisonment, as guaranteed by
section 9 of the Charter. Thorson J.A. stated, in this respect, that
... the finding of not guilty by reason of insanity raises what I accept to be
a reasonable concern that the accused may remain a danger to the public
and in need of further treatment. Under the statute, it is only after such a
finding has been made that the State acquires the right to deprive him for
the time being of his liberty in order that these matters may be properly
assessed, under conditions that ensure the protection of the public.108
The Court of Appeal also rejected challenges to section 542(2) based on
sections 12 and 15 of the Charter. In any event, it was held that, even if
section 542(2) did infringe any of the accused's rights under the Charter,
it nevertheless constituted a "reasonable" limitation within the terms of
section 1.109
There is certainly a degree of irony manifested in the fact that, while
the courts appear to have held consistently that the instrumentality of the
LGW does not contravene the requirements of the Charter, the (former)
Minister of Justice recently introduced draft legislation to "modernize
106. (1986), 24 C.C.C.(3d) 385.
107. Id, at 408-415. Thorson J.A. noted that section 545 requires the Lieutenant Governor
to make an order either for the accused's release or for his/her continued detention. It was also
pointed out that section 547 requires periodic review of an accused's case by the review board.
108. Id, at 415-416.
109. Id, at 424-427.
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and clarify Criminal Code provisions with respect to mentally disordered
offenders". 10 Among the most significant of the proposed reforms to the
Code is the abolition of the role of the Lieutenant Governors in the
disposition and review process for individuals acquitted by reason of
insanity or found unfit to stand trial; the vacuum would be filled by the
review boards, which would be granted full decision-making powers in
relation to the disposition of such persons.11' In addition, the proposed
amendments contain a provision to "cap" or set a maximum limit upon
the period during which such a person may be held in custody." 2
Interestingly, in each case, the rationale for these proposed reforms is
based upon the perceived requirements of the Charter"3. Since the
introduction of the draft legislation, Parliament was prorogued and it
remains to be seen whether the new Minister of Justice will re-introduce
the proposed amendments in the new session.
In one other case" 4 involving the insanity defence and the Charter, the
Manitoba Court of Appeal ruled that Section 16(4) of the Criminal
Code, which places the burden of proof in relation to the insanity defence
upon the accused, does not contravene section 11(d) of the Charter,
which guarantees the presumption of innocence. O'Sullivan, J.A. noted
that
... there is nothing in s. 16(4) of the Code contrary to the Charter of
Rights. The onus remains on the Crown to prove every ingredient of an
offence beyond a reasonable doubt but in doing so the Crown may rely on
the presumption of sanity. 15
Later, the learned Justice indicated that the presumption of sanity might
well work to the accused's own advantage:
... Ido not see any justification for holding that the Charter of Rights was
intended to invalidate the presumption of sanity, a presumption which is
110. Supra, note 47.
111. It is proposed that the trial court may have a role to play in making an interim disposition
in certain limited circumstances.
112. For those individuals who are acquitted by reason of insanity in relation to a charge of
first degree murder, the maximum period of detention would be for life. However, for all other
offences against the person or for offences that endanger public security, the limit on
incarceration would be either ten years or the maximum possible sentence of imprisonment for
such an offence, whichever is less. For all other offences, the limit would be ten years or the
maximum sentence, whichever is less. If an acquittee requires further hospitalization after the
maximum period of detention has been completed, then he/she must be civilly committed
under the terms of the applicable provincial mental health legislation. These proposals would
also apply to those defendants found unfit to stand trial.
113. See Minister of Justice, Information Paper, supra, note 47, at 1-2.
114. Regina v. Godfrey (1984), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (Man. C.A.).
115. Id, at 237.
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available not only to the Crown in criminal prosecutions but also to
accused persons who might otherwise be sent off to a hospital for the
insane for an indefinite period even though their insanity is in doubt.
116
VI. Conclusions
I am never better than when I am mad. Then methinks I am a brave
fellow; then I do wonders. But reason abuseth me, and there's the torment,
there's the hell.
Thomas Kyd, The Spanish Tragedy (1592)
In light of the preceding analysis, it can perhaps be argued that Canadian
mental health law has, in a number of respects, experienced certain
reforms that reflect the influence of the "new legalism", although it is fair
to say that only a minority of Canadian provinces have so far witnessed
the emergence of this trend. However, the advent of the Charter may
very well herald the expansion of this development throughout the
various Canadian jurisdictions.
As noted earlier, it would seem that the "new legalism" has had little,
if any, impact upon the day-to-day balance of power between mental
health professionals and patients since the process of civil commitment is
still effectively in the control of the professionals and the major
mechanism for overseeing this process is the mental health review
tribunal which is itself dominated (in most Canadian jurisdictions) by the
professionals themselves. If the "new legalism" has, to date, not resulted
in the imposition of effective legal controls upon mental health
professionals, the question arises as to whether there may be other
(perhaps less desirable) effects of this emerging trend.
One aspect of the "new legalism", as it has unfolded, is that it seems
to represent an attempt to limit access to public mental health services.
Although Gostin's conception of the "new legalism" envisages the use of
the law to render effective mental health services more readily available
to mental health patients, there has been no evidence in Canada of a
desire to establish an unequivocal right to treatment services, whether in
public hospitals or in the community.
On the other hand, the evolution of stricter criteria for the involuntary
commitment of mental health patients will render compulsory admission
a more difficult option and is likely to reduce the numbers of persons
who are treated on this basis. Similarly, the imposition of stricter controls
upon the use of certain mental health therapies and the requirement that
certain treatment decisions be subjected to independent review is likely to
exclude marginal groups of patients from access to hospitalization. In an
116. Id, at 239.
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atmosphere of increasing legal regulation, it may well be that only those
persons who are deemed to be "treatable" will be admitted to hospital.
The expansion of the review board system may also persuade mental
health professionals to detain and treat only those patients who are
suffering from the most severe forms of mental illness. Furthermore, since
it ultimately requires the evolution of a system of vigorous advocacy on
behalf of mental health patients, it could be argued that the "new
legalism" could result in a situation where mental health professionals
become even more reluctant to tieat patients under the civil commitment
option. One possible interpretation of the trend towards the "new
legalism", therefore, is that it reflects an attempt on the part of
governments to reduce the rate of increase in its expenditures on the
mental health system. It is presumably no coincidence that the England
and Wales Mental Health Ac4 1983 (according to Gostin, the archetype
of the "new legalism") was enacted during the regime of Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, if we cast a glance south of the border to
California, it may be noted that the "grandfather" of legalistic mental
health statutes in the United States (namely, the Lanterman-Petris-Short
Act of 1967) was enacted when then-Governor Ronald Reagan was
making an explicit attempt to reduce expenditures upon the state's mental
health system. As Warren notes in her book n1 7 concerning the Act:
LPS was intended to partially replace the more costly 24-hour state
hospital care system with less restrictive and less expensive alternatives,
such as board and care homes, day-care centers, and community health
clinics.
As Gordon and Verdun-Jones have suggested," 8 the increase of formal
legal controls on the delivery of mental health services in public hospitals
may ultimately have its roots either in a so-called "fiscal crisis" in social
welfare systems or in a calculated policy of "fiscal reallocation" in
support of monetarist economic policies.
As a final comment, it should be noted that the rise of a "new
legalism" has taken place within the context of three other developments
of major importance in the mental health sector; namely, de-
institutionalization, non-institutionalization and privatization. Public
hospitals are releasing their inmates into the less salubrious quarters of a
number of Canadian cities and increasingly legalistic mental health
statutes are restricting access to such facilities on the part of potential
patients.
117. C.A.B. Warren, The Court of Last Resort: Mental illness and the Law (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1982), at 22.
118. See Gordon & Verdun-Jones, supra, note 1, at 78.
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As de-institutionalization from the public hospitals takes place under
the banner of enlightenment and humanitarianism, patients are being
turned over, in increasing numbers, to the private sector. This
development has been dubbed the "privatization and profitization of
social control" 119 and, in the specific case of the mental health system, the
"recommodification" of the mental health patient. 20 According to
Andrew Scull, 121 a new "trade in lunacy" is taking shape in which the
mental health patient is becoming a "commodity" to be bought and sold
by the private sector in the welfare marketplace, as this sector assumes
many of the social control and welfare functions relinquished by the state
because of changes in its fiscal policies.
The track record of the private sector, insofar as its treatment of ex-
mental health patients is concerned, leaves much to be desired,
particularly where services are provided for profit. For example, in
talking of the situation confronting de-institutionalized patients in
Toronto, a Professor of Social Work at the University of Toronto 22 has
declared:
Though many group homes are run by committed and highly effective
non-profit agencies, the vast majority of discharged clients are housed by
private entrepreneurs, often under conditions that should be utterly
unacceptable in any civilized society.
In Lightman's view, the actual practice of de-institutionalization in
Canada "must rank as one of the great frauds of our day".123 Giving the
responsibility for caring for de-institutionalized patients to the family and
the community promotes disastrous conditions when the state does not
provide the resources necessary to permit either the family or the so-
called "community" to assume this responsibility. According to
Lightman, the consequence is that "ex-patients are ghettoized in cheap
rooming houses concentrated in certain neighbourhoods of major urban
centres, without access to adequate support services".1 24
119. S. Spitzer & A.T. Scull, "Privatization and Capitalist Development: The Case of the
Private Police" (1977), 25 Social Problems 18.
120. Scull, A.T., "A New Trade in Lunacy: The Re-Commodification of the Mental Patient"
(1981), 24 American Behavioral Scientist 741.
121. Id
122. E.S. Lightman, "The Impact of Government Economic Restraint on Mental Health
Services in Canada" (1986), 34(1) Canada's Mental Health 24. See also Social Planning
Council of Metro Toronto, Caring for Profit" The Commercialization of Human Services in
Ontario (Toronto: S.P.C.M.T., 1984).
123. Supra, note 122, at 26. It is, by no means, clear that the conditions described by
Lightman in relation to the urban area of Toronto are duplicated in all other urban centres in
Canada. Obviously, more research needs to be undertaken in order to determine the situation
across Canada as a whole.
124. Id, at 26.
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Obviously, if the "new legalism" is to serve the interests of the mental
health patient, as opposed to those of the state, it will be necessary for
provincial legislatures to entrench a right to effective mental health
services (as Gostin originally envisaged in coining the phrase "new
legalism") and such a right should include an entitlement to effective
treatment in the community, wherever possible. The need to ensure an
entitlement to treatment in the community may assume considerable
importance in the future, if the trend towards "restraint" in expenditures
on the mental health system contines apace. Indeed, American evidence
suggests that the major casualty of fiscal retrenchment in the mental
health sector has been community services, l25 despite the evidence that
community alternatives are more effective and less costly than mental
hospitalization.126. In addition, it will be necessary for the mental health
law of the future to concern itself more deeply with the regulation of the
private sector. Traditionally, mental health legislation has been almost
exclusively concerned with the control of potential abuses in the public
sector. However, the abuses of the future are far more likely to occur in
the private sector and, if an extra dose of legalism is to be administered
on behalf of mental health patients, it is in the private sector that it should
be delivered. Interestingly enough, the Australian State of New South
Wales, which in 1983 enacted what many would consider to be a
paragon of the "new legalism" in its Mental Health Ac4 1983127, placed
great emphasis upon the need to control the activities of the private
mental health sector. Furthermore, the government has decided not to
implement the legalistic provisions of the Act until adequate funding is
made available to community mental health and housing facilities. 28
Hopefully, some important lessons may be gleaned by Canadians from
this approach, particularly insofar as the provision of accommodation for
mental health patients in Canada is concerned.
As de-institutionalization proceeds apace, it is likely that there will be
an increasing demand for the provision of guardianship services. 29
Guardians may be responsible for making treatment decisions on behalf
125. R.W. Surber et aL, "Effects of Fiscal Retrenchment on Public Mental Health Services for
the Chronic Mentally Ill" (1986), 22 Community Mental Health Journal 215.
126. C.A. Kiesler & A.E. Sibulkin, Mental Hospitalizationr Myths and Facts About a National
Crisis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1987), c.9.
127. See S.N. Verdunt-Jones, "The Dawn of a 'New Legalism' in Australia? The New South
Wales Mental Health Act 1983 and Related Legislation" (1985), 8 International Journal of
Law and Psychiatry 95.
128. Id, at 98-99.
129. See R.M. Gordon, S.N. Verdun-Jones & D. MacDougall, Standing in Their Shoes:
Guardianship, Trusteeship and the Elderly Canadian (Report submitted to the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, June 1986).
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of, or in conjunction with, disabled and disordered persons and may act
in such a manner as to ensure that the latter are housed and cared for in
humane surroundings. With the exception of the province of Alberta,
which maintains a public guardianship system, 130 relatively little attention
has been paid in Canada to this device. Ironically, and perhaps
predictably, although guardianship of the person has been a matter that
has not attracted the attention of provincial legislatures, trusteeship of the
property of disabled and disordered individuals has. Each of the ten
Canadian provinces has established a publicly funded and operated
trusteeship service that provides protective services.' 3' A well-informed
cynic might well point out that there are at least two reasons why the
state has been more eager to furnish protective services for an individual's
property than for his/her person. First, trusteeship services are paid for
out of the disabled individual's estate and, in many provinces, either a
profit is made from such fees or a substantial portion of the cost of
providing services is recovered from the estate. Second, the state has a
strong interest in managing and maintaining the disabled person's
property so that he/she does not become a charge upon the public purse.
It remains to be seen whether the rise of the "new legalism" will result
not only in the imposition of a greater degree of control upon the practice
of the mental health professions but also in the enshrinement of a right to
effective treatment both in the hospital and the community settings.
While a number of Canadian jurisdictions manifest an increasing number
of elements of the "new legalism", these elements relate almost
exclusively to the imposition of controls upon mental health
professionals. To date, little attention has been paid to the need to harness
mental health law in the service of a campaign to combat the tragic
fallout from the intertwined policies of de-institutionalization, non-
institutionalization and privatization. Obviously, Gostin's "new legalism"
has only been implemented, if at all, on a partial basis. From the point of
view of Canada's mental health patients, it remains to be seen whether
half a loaf is better or worse than no loaf at all.
130. J. Christie, "Guardianship in Alberta, Canada", in T. Apolloni & T. Cooke, eds., A New
Look at Guardianship (Baltimore: Brookes, 1984).
131. R.M. Gordon & S.N. Verdun-Jones, "Privatization and Protective Services for the
Elderly: Some Observations on the Economics of the Aging Process" (1986), 8 International
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 311.
